The noise trader sentiment model of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a) is applied to futures markets. The theoretical results predict that overly optimistic (pessimistic) noise traders result in market prices that are greater (less) than fundamental value. Thus, returns can be predicted using the level of noise trader sentiment. The null rational expectations hypothesis is tested against the noise trader alternative using a commercial market sentiment index as a proxy for noise trader sentiment. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions test if noise traders create a systematic bias in futures prices. The time-series predictability of futures returns using known sentiment levels is tested in a Cumby-Modest market timing framework and a more general causality specification. The empirical results lead to the following conclusions. First, there is no evidence that noise trader sentiment creates a systematic bias in futures prices. Second, predictable market returns using noise trader sentiment is not characteristic of futures markets in general. Third, futures market returns at weekly intervals are characterized by low-order positive autocorrelation with relatively small autoregressive parameters. In those instances where there is evidence of noise trader effects, it is at best limited to isolated markets and particular specifications.
persist in markets, and thereby, exert a destabilizing influence on prices (e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1989 , 1990a , 1990b , 1991 Lux; Palomino) . In this research, new empirical evidence is brought to bear on theoretical noise trader models.
Previous empirical research concerning noise trading tends to focus on the symptoms rather than the cause. That is, market behavior is examined for characteristics that suggest the presence of noise traders (e.g., Liu, Thompson, and Newbold) . For instance, autocorrelation (e.g., Taylor) or mean-reversion (e.g., Ma, Dare, and Donaldson) in futures returns can be generated by noise traders; but, they may also arise from a disequilibrium adjustment process (Beja and Goldman) or some time-varying risk premium (Bessembinder) . These studies test market rationality, but they do so without a clearly defined alternative hypothesis. Researchers that do hypothesize well-defined noise trader alternatives often must rely on somewhat ad hoc empirical measures of noise trader sentiment (e.g., Ma, Peterson, and Sears; Kodres) .
In this paper, a futures market variant of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann's (1990a) noise trader sentiment model is developed. The model provides a clear alternative to market rationality. The model's predictions are tested using a commercial measure of market sentiment, which is based on surveys of market participants' price outlook. Consequently, noise trader sentiment reflects actual retail speculators' expectations. Using the bullish consensus index as a proxy for noise trader sentiment, the research seeks to determine if noise trader sentiment creates a direct and systematic price pressure effect on futures prices, where price pressure materializes as a systematic forecast bias or in the time series predictability of returns.
A Noise Trader Risk Model for Futures Markets
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (DSSW, 1990a) develop an overlapping generations model that provides considerable insight into the behavior of asset prices in markets populated by noise traders. However, the model is not directly applicable to futures markets.
Most notably, the unsafe asset in the economy is fixed in supply; whereas, there is a net zero supply of futures contracts. A simple modification is made within the model to derive the impact of noise trader sentiment on zero net supply investments. The resulting model is more applicable to futures markets. 1 DSSW's model is a parsimonious overlapping generations model with no labor supply decision, bequest, or first period consumption. There are two assets: a safe asset, s, and an 2 unsafe asset, u. The safe asset is in perfectly elastic supply, pays a real dividend, r, in every period, and has a fixed price of 1. The unsafe asset pays the same real dividend, r, in every period as the safe asset, and it has a price of p . In DSSW's model, the unsafe asset is in perfectly t inelastic supply normalized at one unit. Here, in the spirit of a futures market, the unsafe asset has a net zero supply.
There are two types of two-period-lived agents: rational investors, I, and noise traders, n.
The rational investors have rational expectations concerning the distribution of p and are present ) . ) . ) n t (' t ) .
E(U)c
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(1)
Both agent types choose portfolios when young (i.e., first period of life) to maximize perceived expected utility given their beliefs about the ex ante distribution of u when they are old, t+1. Each agent has a constant absolute risk aversion utility function: U=-exp , where,
-(2)w is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Each agent maximizes the expected utility of final wealth, w, which is equivalent in a mean-variance framework to maximizing: E(U) = w-) . * 2 w
The representative sophisticated investor rationally perceives the distribution of returns, and chooses amount of the risky asset, u, to maximize expected utility:
The first term in brackets is the expected capital gain from investing in the unsafe asset, and the second term in brackets is the effective dividend of the unsafe asset due to purchasing it at a discount or premium to its fundamental value. The constant, c , is a function of first period labor 0 income. Following DSSW we can rearrange (1) to get the following expression for the 3,4 sophisticated investor's expected utility:
Like the sophisticated investor, the representative noise trader chooses the amount of the unsafe asset, , to maximize expected utility:
The difference between the two representative traders' expected utility is the last term in (3): the noise trader's misperception of capital gains due to irrational sentiment, ' .
(1r) .
The representative rational and noise traders maximize their expected utility, resulting in demands (4) and (5), respectively.
Demands are increasing in perceived returns and decreasing in perceived variance. The 5 difference in (4) and (5) 
Assuming that the futures price is equal to fundamental value of 1 at expiration, and applying iterative expectations (e.g., Samuelson), the pricing equation (8) can be rewritten to display the time series characteristics and equilibrium pricing respectively:
and taking expectations, where, R is the continuously compounded percentage change in the futures price over the t interval n.
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From equation (10), the noise trader model suggests that the forecast error at any time t is not random, but contains a deterministic bias, -(µ' )/r, as well as time-varying component, -µ(' -* t ' )/(1+r). The pricing error at time t (i.e., the deviation from fundamental or final value) is * inversely proportional to the sentiment of noise traders at time t. If noise traders are unduly bullish at time t, (' >' ), then the futures forecast is too high and prices will decline. Likewise, t * bearish time t noise traders, (' <' ), are associated with rising futures prices, R >0. To the extent t t * that ' is known, then the futures price violates the efficiency or orthogonality condition of t traditional rational models (Muth) .
Additionally, in equation (11), futures prices are on average biased forecasts of fundamental value, and the expected bias equals -(µ' )/r. That is, the deterministic bias in * futures prices is proportional to the average level of sentiment among noise traders. The more bearish noise traders are on average (the lower ' ) for a particular commodity, then the greater * the downward bias in the futures price, p . Consequently, the futures price will rise on average t-n towards fundamental value. The predictions in equations (10) and (11) provide distinct, empirically testable, alternatives to a rational expectations hypothesis. The following sections discuss two approaches to empirically testing the noise trader predictions: cross-sectional and time series.
Empirical Methodology
A central prediction of the noise trader model presented above is that noise traders force prices away from fundamental value. That is, when noise traders are bullish, prices are pushed above their rationally expected value. It is inherently difficult to determine ex ante the fundamental value of an asset, however, the ex post realization of price serves as a guide. That is, within the context of futures markets, the current futures price provides a forecast for the cash price expected to prevail at contract expiration. In a rational market (in the Muthian sense) with no risk premium, the futures price is an unbiased and efficient forecast. In contrast, the noise trader model predicts that forecast errors will be influenced by the sentiment of noise traders.
Couched within a rational expectations framework, cross-sectional regressions are specified to test if noise traders introduce a systematic bias in futures prices, and time series models of return predictability are specified to test for forecast efficiency. These tests improve upon prior methodology (e.g., Ma, Donaldson, and Sears) by directly testing the impact of noise trader sentiment under a well-defined alternative hypothesis.
(13)
Cross-Sectional Test for Systematic Forecast Bias
Under the rational expectations hypothesis the expected bias in futures prices is zero. Let ' be a sample estimate of the mean noise trader sentiment in market I. The following * I cross-sectional model is derived from equation (11), and can be empirically estimated as,
The average forecast bias, R , is a function of the average level of noise trader sentiment in * I market I. Following the procedure set forth by Fama and MacBeth, the cross-sectional regressions are estimated using ex ante estimates of ' . That is, ' is estimated over K periods,
cross-sectional observations. This process is repeated for each J length non-overlapping subperiods in the entire sample.
For example, consider a sample of one hundred weekly observations on fifteen markets, and let K=10 and J=10. Then, for each market, ' is calculated over observations one through * I ten, and this is the independent variable in the cross-sectional regression explaining R , which is * I calculated over observations eleven through twenty. The second cross-sectional regression for this data set would use ' calculated over observations eleven through twenty to explain R * * I I calculated over observations twenty-one through thirty. This procedure would be repeated through all one hundred time series observations, resulting in nine cross-sectional regressions (15 observations each) for the entire sample.
The individual regression results can be pooled, and inferences are drawn from the M separate OLS cross-sectional regression equations using the Fama and MacBeth procedure, Using the distribution of the average slope coefficient, , the null hypothesis of no predictable * bias across markets, g0, can be tested using a two-tailed t-test calculated with the average slope estimate and its standard error. Note that a finding of <0 supports the noise trader alternative, 8 whereas a finding of >0 rejects the null hypothesis but is not supportive of any particular alternative hypothesis.
Time Series Tests for Predictability
The rational expectations hypothesis posits that the futures' forecast error is orthogonal to the available information set. Consequently, the futures return, R , is random, and the forecast is t efficient with respect to available information. In contrast, the noise trader model in (11) indicates that the forecast error, and subsequently R , is not orthogonal to all information. Rather, t R is correlated with and can be predicted by noise trader sentiment at time t-n, ' . Specifically, t t-n if noise traders are bullish (bearish), then the futures' forecast is overly optimistic (pessimistic) and the subsequent return is predicted to be negative (positive). The first test of return predictability is a relatively simple specification of market timing developed by Cumby and Modest, and the second is a more general specification of predictability associated with Granger.
The Cumby-Modest Test
The usefulness of sentiment in predicting price changes can be evaluated in the market timing framework proposed by Cumby and Modest (C-M). Empirically, sentiment provides market signals through extremely high levels, K , and low levels, K . The (C-M) test evaluates H L the ability to be on the correct side of major price changes with the following OLS regression: Specifically, the noise trader model suggests that <0 or >0, indicating that sentiment has a 1 2 negative impact on returns.
Causality Tests
A general method of exploring the linear linkages between price and sentiment is to test for "Granger causality." Hamilton suggests the following direct or bivariate Granger test:
where, R and ' are futures returns and noise trader sentiment, respectively, and is a white markets. Pooling time series data across markets not only increases the power of the tests, but also provides a concise way of presenting and testing for common noise trader effects in similar markets.
Choosing the appropriate lag lengths (m and n) is of practical significance in performing the causality test (see Jones) . As suggested by Beveridge and Oickle, the order of an autoregressive system may best be determined by searching all possible lags for the combination that minimizes a model selection criterion. For example, in (16) the model is estimated by varying the own-lag length of R from m=1,2,...m , and the lag length of ' from n=1,2,...,n t t max max such that a total of (m x n ) regressions are estimated. The m,n lag length combination that max max minimizes Akaike's information criteria (AIC) is chosen as the final model specification. This search procedure is conducted for equation (16) for each individual market within a commodity group (results not shown). Then, the lag-lengths for the pooled regressions are specified by choosing the maximum m and the maximum n from among the individual market specifications within a group. For instance in the grain group the maximum m was 5 (for the corn model) and the maximum n was 1 (for the wheat and soybean models); therefore, the pooled grain model's lag structure is 5,1. This specification procedure may over-specify lag structures at the expense of statistical power, but it assures that the model does not suffer from an under-specification bias. were published during the week. It is released early the following week by recorded telephone message and published in the following Friday's edition of CONSENSUS.
The CBSI is available weekly for twenty-eight futures markets from May 1983 through September 1994 (591 observations). The availability of sentiment data on a broad cross-section of markets will strengthen general conclusions and avoid erroneous implications based on the nuances of a particular market. For pooled estimation purposes and to facilitate the presentation of results, related markets are designated into commodity groups. Group classification is based on common production/consumption patterns and expectations concerning the correlation of returns and sentiment among the markets. The five commodity groups include: grain; livestock; food/fiber; financial; and metal/energy. A complete listing of groups and markets is presented in Table 1 .
As a maintained hypothesis, it is assumed that the indices compiled by Consensus Inc.
reflect the sentiment of noise traders--not rational or informed market participants. That is, the market views subsumed within the indices are those of smaller retail speculators who are acting on non-information: technical trading rules, extrapolation, or old news that is already incorporated into the market price. This maintained hypothesis is supported by reviewing the decision-making rules of small traders and their information sources.
Surveys by Canoles, Smidt, The Chicago Board of Trade (see Draper), and Barron's (see Draper) find that the average amateur futures trader is highly educated and trades for the leverage and excitement. Furthermore, these speculators generally do not bring new information to bear on the markets; rather, they collect much of their information from focused media sources such as those surveyed by Consensus. Market advisors, brokers, and newsletters provide decisionmaking information for retail futures speculators; but, are they providing real information, or simply relaying old news and technical comments? Excerpts from CONSENSUS, such as in the introduction to this paper, indicate that market advisors rely heavily on technical indicators for decision-making and simply pass along this information to their retail subscribers. A minority of newsletters are fundamental in nature, relaying government reports, seasonal tendencies, and pertinent cash market conditions. Although these newsletters often contain detailed interpretations of relevant supply and demand factors, the fundamental analysis tends to reiterate public information, and it provides rather vague price predictions.
The non-informational nature of the market newsletters, coupled with the evidence that retail investors rely on this advise in making decisions, supports the maintained hypothesis: the sentiment indices are reasonable proxies for noise trader sentiment. To the extent that "systems"
and pseudo-signals are correlated across the advisors, then this group of noise traders will act in concert and can potentially impact market prices.
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Noise Trader Impact on Futures Prices Cross Sectional Test Results
The cross-sectional equation (13), is estimated with OLS using weekly observations of the CBSI along with weekly futures returns. The ' are calculated over fifty week formation 13, 14 i * periods (K=50), and the R are calculated over the subsequent fifty weeks (J=50). The fifty-week * i formation and testing periods were chosen instead of (say) 52 weeks to maximize the number of complete samples that could be drawn from the data set. This results in eleven independent cross-sectional regressions formed from May 1983 through September 1994.
The eleven individual cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 2 . The rational expectations (null) hypothesis predicts that = 0, while the noise trader model predicts that the slope coefficient is negative, < 0. Looking at the individual regression results in The results of the cross-sectional tests can be sensitive to the size of both the formation (K) and testing periods (J). There is no strong justification for using a fifty week period. So, to test the model's sensitivity to alternative formation and testing period lengths, the cross-sectional regressions are estimated with K, J values of (50,100), (25,25), (25,50) , and (5,5). The alternative Fama-MacBeth estimation results are presented in Table 3 . The results are not materially different from the (50,50) pooled model in Table 2 . Average slope coefficients are negative in three of the five cases, but none are statistically different than zero.
The null hypothesis of no systematic bias, =0, in futures prices cannot be rejected in favor of the noise trader alternative, <0, using cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth estimation of equation (13). This result is robust to alternative lengths of both the formation and test period (i.e., values of K and J). In general, the average level of noise trader sentiment has no discernable ability to explain cross-sectional variation in futures market returns.
Cumby-Modest Test Results
The C-M model, equation (15) The C-M test results for the individual markets are presented in Table 4 . The t-statistic for each parameter equaling zero is presented in parentheses, and the Chi-squared statistic tests the joint null that both slope coefficients equal zero (p-value provided). For individual markets, the number of extreme observations constitute from 4.3% (23) to 30% (161) of the 536 total observations. Based on Chi-squared statistics, the null hypothesis of no timing ability ( = =0) 1 2 is rejected at the 5% level in three of the twenty-eight markets (LC, CD, HU). This is more than would be expected by chance (0.05 X 28 = 1.25 rejections). The null hypothesis is rejected for two more markets (S, CC) at the 10% level.
While there is evidence of a significant relationship between extreme sentiment and returns, the direction of the relationship generally is not as expected from noise trader theory.
Recall that is expected to be negative and positive, as returns reverse after extreme levels of 1 2 noise trader sentiment. It is found that is negative for only 10 of the 28 markets, and is 1 2 positive for only 10 markets. If anything, the relationship is one of continuation, where returns increase (decrease) after high (low) sentiment, rather than reversal. In addition, there is variation in the coefficient signs for those markets where the null is rejected. For instance, if the CBSI is below 20, then the following week nearby live cattle (LC) returns increase by 2.07% on average, while Canadian dollar (CD) returns fall 0.187%.
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To reveal noise trader effects that are systematic within related markets, the C-M test is estimated as a pooled cross-sectional time series using Kmenta's cross-sectionally correlated, heteroskedastic, and time-wise autoregressive GLS estimation technique. Pooling restricts the estimated parameters to be the same for each market. In doing so, it reveals noise trader effects that are uniform and systematic across the markets.
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The pooled C-M tests with K = 80 and K = 20 are presented in Panel B of Table 5 . Of H L the five market groups, the null of no market timing is rejected at the 5% level for the grains and at the 10% level for the financials. Again, the coefficient signs are not entirely consistent with theory, as only 3 of the ten signs are as predicted. As an example, the estimated coefficients indicate that weekly grain futures returns increase by 0.0689% after sentiment readings below 20 percent and increase by 0.4029% after sentiment readings above 80 percent. 
Causality Test Results
Equation (16) The empirical model's lag structure is specified using the search procedure described The Granger causality test results for individual markets are presented in Table 6 . The first Chi-squared statistic tests the null that sentiment does not lead returns, and the t-statistic tests if the sum of lagged sentiment coefficients equals zero. The second Chi-squared statistic tests the null full orthogonality condition, i.e., all coefficients equal zero. Looking at the first Chi-squared test, the null hypothesis that sentiment does not lead returns is rejected at the 5% level for two markets (LB and TB). The null is rejected for four more markets (FC, CC, JO, and LH) at the 10% level. The noise trader model predicts an inverse relationship between sentiment and returns. However, the t-statistics for H : = 0 are not consistently negative. In fact, 9 of 0 j the 14 t-statistics are positive, again indicating a tendency toward continuation instead of reversal.
The second Chi-squared statistic in Table 6 tests the null hypothesis that neither sentiment nor past returns lead future returns, i.e., returns are not predictable with the information contained in past returns and sentiment. This null is rejected in 13 markets 10% level or higher. Of the 13 rejections, 8 are in markets where the first Chi-squared test did not reject the null, and the rejections are concentrated among the food/fiber and metal/energy groups.
Although not presented, the markets where the full orthogonality null is rejected, the rejection primarily stems from low-order positive autocorrelation in returns.
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Collectively, the individual causality models provide some evidence that noise trader sentiment is useful in predicting market returns. However, the null hypothesis that sentiment leads returns is rejected in a minority of the markets. Furthermore, the direction of sentiment's impact is not consistently negative as indicated by the theoretical model. Evidence against the full orthogonality condition, i.e., returns are not predictable with either lagged returns or sentiment, is much more prevalent. In particular, the weekly return series seem to be characterized by low-order positive autocorrelation.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions from the relatively inconsistent results across the individual markets. Therefore, common noise trader effects are tested with pooled crosssectional time series models estimated with Kmenta's cross-sectionally correlated and heteroskedastic GLS procedure. Lag specification is determined by using the maximum m and 21 the maximum n specified among the individual markets comprising the commodity group.
The estimated pooled models are presented in Table 7 . The first Chi-squared statistic (pvalue in parenthesis) tests the null that sentiment does not lead returns, and the second Chisquared statistic tests the full orthogonality condition. The first Chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis for the food/fiber group only. The full orthogonality null hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels for all groups except livestock. Returns in general, and the food/fiber and grain groups in particular, are characterized by positive autocorrelation at short lags with autoregressive parameters along the order of 0.05 to 0.07 in magnitude.
As with the individual market models, the direction of sentiment's impact on returns generally is not consistent with noise trader theory. For example, the food/fiber group's sentiment coefficients are statistically negative at one lag and statistically positive at lags two and five. If sentiment increases by 100 percent, then returns decrease 1.35% one week later, ceteris paribus. The full return response with a one standard deviation shock to weekly sentiment is plotted in Figure 1 for the food/fiber group. The figure shows there is not a well-defined response structure for sentiment leading returns. That is, the response function takes both positive and negative values before converging to zero after 7 weeks.
Summary and Conclusions
In this research, the noise trader sentiment model of DSSW (1990a) is applied to futures markets. The theoretical results predict that overly optimistic (pessimistic) noise traders result in market prices that are greater (less) than fundamental value. Thus, returns can be predicted using the level of noise trader sentiment. Specifically, the noise trader model indicates that futures prices contain a systematic bias that is proportional to the average level of noise trader sentiment, and market returns contain a predictable time-varying component that is inversely related to the level of noise trader sentiment. These predictions pose distinct alternatives to Muth's rational expectations hypothesis.
The null rational expectations hypothesis is tested against the noise trader alternative using commercial market sentiment indices as proxies for noise trader sentiment. FamaMacBeth cross-sectional regressions test if noise traders create a systematic bias in futures prices.
The time-series predictability of futures returns using known sentiment levels is tested in a Cumby-Modest market timing framework and a more general causality specification.
The empirical results lead to the following conclusions. First, there is no evidence that noise trader sentiment creates a systematic bias in futures prices. Second, predictable market returns using noise trader sentiment is not characteristic of futures markets in general. Third, futures market returns at weekly intervals are characterized by low-order positive autocorrelation with relatively small autoregressive parameters. In those instances where there is evidence of noise trader effects, it is at best limited to isolated markets and particular specifications.
The finding that noise trader sentiment has little (or at least an inconsistent) impact on futures prices is compatible with previous research (e.g., Kodres). Based on this limited evidence, it is unlikely that noise traders impose a large cost on society in terms of systematic pricing errors and the subsequent misallocation of resources (Stein) . Thus, concerns about and attempts to curb futures market speculation, particularly trend-following fund activity, may be unfounded (see France, Kodres, and Moser) . However, the cost and impact of noise traders on market micro-structure (see Ma, Peterson, and Sears) warrants further examination; yet, it must be weighed carefully against the liquidity enhancement provided by noise traders (Black).
1.The other major abstraction in DSSW's model from a futures market is that the unsafe asset pays a real dividend, r; whereas, there are no cash flows associated with the ownership of futures contracts. This is a necessary abstraction for the overlapping generations structure of the model. If this aspect of the unsafe asset, u, is not kept, then the model does not have an equilibrium solution. That is, solving (10) recursively results in a geometric series that diverges in the limit.
2.See DSSW (1990a) for a detailed description and discussion of the model's assumptions.
3.Both assets, u and s, pay real dividend r in the second period. Thus, all of first period income earns r regardless of where invested. Thus, c is total second period dividends as a function of 0 invested first period income. The remainder of the terms adjust c for capital gains and the 0 increased (decreased) yield on u from purchasing it at a discount (premium) to fundamental value.
4.Prescripts on random variables represent expectations for the variable taken at the indicated time. For example, p is the expectation at time t for p at time t+1.
7. This assumes futures prices do not reflect a "rational" risk premium.
8.Alternative, methods of estimating and pooling the regression equations exist; however, the Fama-MacBeth regressions have shown to be statistically powerful and are still widely used in the literature (see Elton and Gruber, .
9.Note, mis-specification of equation (16) due to co-integration and an omitted error-correction term is not a problem, as sentiment clearly is stationary I(0) in levels.
10.Alternative lag-length specification procedures were utilized; but, the results were nearly identical to those presented.
11.Consensus, Inc. indicates that some interpretation is required for newsletters that do not explicitly make buy or sell recommendations.
12. An in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the CBSI sentiment data was done. This analysis revealed several salient features: a) the sentiment data are quite volatile with large standard deviations and extremes of above 90 and below 10, b) the sentiment data display a high level of cross-market correlation within commodity groups, and c) the sentiment data indicates that noise traders are predominately positive feedback traders.
Endnotes
13.Weekly futures returns are calculated for the closest to expiration contract where the maturity month has not been entered. To correspond with the release of the sentiment index, returns are calculated Friday-to-Friday using closing prices. Returns, R are calculated as the log-relative t, change in closing prices, ln(p /p ).
14.A battery of diagnostic tests did not reveal any significant violations of OLS assumptions.
15.The Newey-West estimator is also consistent if the error terms are both heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. One operational problem with the Newey-West estimator is that the order of autocorrelation must be specified (see Greene, p. 423) . This is done by examining the Lagrange multiplier statistic at each individual lag length. Then, the order of autocorrelation is set to the longest lag length with a LM statistic significant at the 5% level.
16.In the text, the C-M coefficients are always referred to as the change in returns or expected percent price change, relative to the unconditional return. This is in contrast to the total expected return. For instance, when the CBSI is below 20, the expected weekly LC return increases by 2.07%; but, the total expected return is 2.23% (2.07 + 0.16).
17.An alternative is to estimate the individual market regressions together in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system. This estimation procedure was implemented, but the results were not materially different from the individual OLS regressions. Thus, the models are instead estimated as a pooled cross-sectional time series to not only highlight the common noise trader effects across markets, but also to facilitate the presentation and discussion of the results.
18.It is implicitly assumed that all relevant information is contained in past returns and sentiment.
19.As in the C-M tests, the OLS residuals are often heteroskedastic; thus, White's estimator is used in these cases. Autocorrelation is corrected by adding additional lags of the dependent variable.
20.For example, the LH model has a statistically significant (5% level) first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.124, and HO has second and third-order autocorrelation coefficients of 0.078 and 0.101, respectively.
21.The individual models were also estimated in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, but the results were not materially different from the OLS estimations. Additionally, the SUR models did not enhance the presentation and estimation of common noise trader effects as does the pooled framework. Ticker symbols are presented in parenthesis and used throughout the remainder of the tables * when referring to the various markets. 
